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Abstract—The existing investigations on artificial noise (AN)
security systems assumed that only null spaces is used to send
AN signals, and all eigen-subchannels should be used to transmit
messages. Our previous work proposed an AN scheme that
allocates some of eigen-subchannels to transmit AN signals
for improving secrecy rates. Nevertheless, our previous work
considered only uncorrelated MIMO Rayleigh fading channels. In
fact, the correlations among antennas exist in realistic scattering
channel environments. In this paper, we extend our previous
AN scheme to spatially correlated Rayleigh fading channels at
both legitimate receiver- and eavesdropper-sides and derive an
exact theoretical expression for the ergodic secrecy rate of the
AN scheme, along with an approximate analysis. Both numerical
and simulation results show that the proposed AN scheme offers
a higher ergodic secrecy rate than the existing schemes, revealing
a fact that the correlation among eavesdropper’s antennas can
potentially improve the secrecy rate of an MIMO system.
Index Terms—Artificial noise; Correlated fading channel;
Ergodic secrecy rate; MIMO wiretap channel; Physical layer
security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security has attracted a lot of attention due to
its potential to offer low-cost and high-level security in wire-
less communications [1]–[5]. The idea of utilizing artificial
noise (AN) or jamming signals, as a physical layer security
scheme, was proposed for the first time in Negi and Goel’s
work [6], [7]. Recently, AN schemes have been extended to
different channels to safeguard sensitive and confidential data
[8]–[11]. For instance, [8]–[10] considered Rayleigh MIMO
channels, whereas [11] assumed Rician MIMO channels. The
basic idea of the aforementioned AN schemes is that message
streams are sent in a multiplex mode via all eigen-subchannels
(positive eigenvalue channels) at desired directions, and the
AN signals are transmitted to a null space of desired directions,
such that they do not interfere desired users but only impair
eavesdropped channels.
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However, these AN schemes use a null space for AN
signals only under the condition that the number of transmit
antennas is larger than that of receivers [6]–[13]. In addition,
using all eigen-subchannels in an MIMO system for message
transmission may degrade secrecy rate if compared to the
schemes, which properly allocate some of eigen-subchannels
for AN signals. In our previous work [14], we took the number
of eigen-subchannels of message streams as a variable that can
be leveraged to maximize ergodic secrecy rate and showed
that, when the number of transmit antennas is smaller than
that of receivers, it is possible to find eigen-subchannels used
by AN signals in order not to interfere desired users with the
help of AN elimination technique at the desired users. The
work in [14] was done based on a Rayleigh fading channel,
as Rayleigh fading is a reasonable model for heavily built-
up urban environments [12], which has been extended to
uncorrelated Rician fading channels via a non-central Wishart
matrix in [15]. Zheng et al. also used eigen-subchannels for
AN signal transmission, but treated the AN as interference
signals due to the lack of proper AN elimination techniques
[16].
It is noted that all of the aforementioned schemes assumed
the presence of uncorrelated fading in MIMO channels. Un-
fortunately, in many real applications, the correlation among
antennas may exist due to poor-scattering environments or
small spacing between antenna elements [17]–[19]. It mo-
tivates us to design a better AN scheme to suit for cor-
related fading environments. Recently, Li [20] investigated
secure transmissions in an MISO-based system with receiver-
side correlation in satellite-terrestrial channels. The effect of
double-side correlation in the main and wiretap channels of
MIMO systems was studied via Monte Carlo simulations in
[21] and [22]. All of the above investigations showed that the
correlation has its impacts on security performance. However,
the effect of receiver-side correlation of MIMO-aided AN
systems has not been fully investigated so far, and an exact
expression for ergodic secrecy rate of AN schemes is far more
useful than Monte Carlo simulation results because it provides
us an objective function to disclose the relationship between
secrecy rate and channel correlation.
This paper focuses on receiver-side correlated fading sce-
narios at both legitimate receiver- and eavesdropper-sides.
As shown in a report on the downlink channel correlation
by 3GPP [17], transmitters are located at base stations with
enough space to deploy multiple antennas, and the size of
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a receiver (e.g., a mobile terminal) is usually small. Thus,
receiver-side correlation more likely occurs than transmitter-
side correlation in downlink channels. In addition, in 5G and
beyond systems, the receivers, such as vehicles and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), may move to an appropriate location
for secrecy transmission, whose channel correlation parame-
ters may change from time to time based on statistical channel
information [23], such as mean angles of arrival (AoA) and
receive angle spread (RAS). Some devices with a very small
antenna separation distance (such as massive MIMO) will
emerge for secure communications in the future.
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as
follows.
1) We extend the AN scheme [14] to receiver-side corre-
lated MIMO channels, and derive an exact expression
for ergodic secrecy rates. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time to give such an exact expression in
terms of spatial correlation parameters (i.e., mean AoA,
RAS, and antenna spacing, etc.). A suitable number of
eigen-subchannels for messages and AN can be easily
identified based on the derived ergodic secrecy rate
expression. Then, we simplify the expression and give
its approximate analysis.
2) In addition, we derive an exact closed-form expression
for marginal probability density function (pdf) of the kth
eigenvalue of receiver-side correlated Wishart matrices.
The work in [24] required two expressions to formulate
this function. We need only one expression as a more
generalized form. We identify the properties of the corre-
lated matrices in terms of spatial correlation parameters.
The mathematical investigations given in the paper are
general, which can also be used for analyzing ergodic
secrecy rates of an AN scheme and channel capacities
of traditional MIMO systems.
The remainder of this paper can be outlined as follows.
Section II introduces the system model and AN scheme.
Section III aims to derive an exact mathematical expression
for ergodic secrecy rates, along with an approximate analysis.
Section IV is dedicated for numerical analysis and simulations,
followed by the conclusions in Section V.
The notations are explained as follows. Bold uppercase
letters denote matrices and bold lowercase letters denote
column vectors. A† represents the Hermitian transpose of A.
Ia is an identity matrix with its rank a. Sa denotes an (a×a)
square matrix with its order a. E[·] denotes the expectation
operator. [A]i,j gives the ith row and the jth column element
of A. [A](i∼u),(j∼v) is a submatrix of A, including the ith
to the uth rows and the jth to the vth columns of A. exp(x)
denotes an exponential function of x. det[A] is the determinant
of A. etr(X) denotes exp[Tr(X)], where Tr(X) is the trace
of X. ⊗ stands for a Kronecker product. An [a × (b + c)]
matrix [A,B] denotes a combined matrix between an (a× b)
matrix A and an (a× c) matrix B. (A)1/2 represents matrix
square root operation such that A1/2(A1/2)† = A.
(
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y
)
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(
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Fig. 1. Illustration of an artificial noisy MIMO wiretap channel model, where
Alice, Bob, and Eve use uniformly linear array antennas, and θ is AoA
between a scattered path and the antenna array.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce a system model that specifies
a spatial correlation channel, as well as the AN scheme.
A. MIMO Wiretap Channel with Spatial Correlation
Let us consider an MIMO communication system in the
presence of correlated Rayleigh fading at both legitimate
receiver- and the eavesdropper-sides. The system consists of
a transmitter (Alice) with t transmit antennas, a legitimate
receiver (Bob) with r receive antennas, and an eavesdropper
(Eve) with e receive antennas, as shown in Fig. 1, where
t > e and r is arbitrary. In general, the main channel between
Alice and Bob and the wiretap channel between Alice and
Eve are defined by receiver-side correlated complex Gaussian
matrices H ∈ Cr×t and He ∈ Ce×t, as given in Definition 1.
Rr ∈ Cr×r and Re ∈ Ce×e are the receiver-side correlated
channel matrices of Bob and Eve, respectively, as given in
Definition 2.
Definition 1 (Central complex Gaussian matrix): Each ele-
ment of a random matrix A ∈ Ca×b takes a complex value,
whose real and imaginary parts follow a normal distribution
N (0, 1/2). A is defined as a central complex Gaussian matrix
with a covariance matrix Φa ⊗Ψb, which is expressed as
A ∼ CN a,b(0,Φa ⊗Ψb), (1)
where Ψb = E[ai,(1∼b)a
†
i,(1∼b)] for i = 1, ..., a, and Φa =
E[a(1∼a),ja
†
(1∼a),j ] for j = 1, ..., b. The (a×a) matrix Φa and
(b×b) matrix Ψb are the Hermitian positive definite matrices.
A similar definition of this complex Gaussian matrix can be
found in [24], [25].
In order to investigate H and He in the model, let us use
a Kronecker model to define
H = R1/2r HBob ∼ CN r,t(0,Rr ⊗ It), (2)
He = R
1/2
e HEve ∼ CN e,t(0,Re ⊗ It), (3)
where HBob ∈ Cr×t and HEve ∈ Ce×t are complex Gaus-
sian random matrices with independent complex Gaussian
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elements. Similar to A, the real and imaginary parts of
each element of HBob and HEve follow a normal distribution
N (0, 1/2). HBob and HEve can be expressed respectively as
HBob ∼ CN r,t(0, Ir ⊗ It), (4)
HEve ∼ CN e,t(0, Ie ⊗ It). (5)
The correlated matrices Rr and Re are the key factors in
deriving channel state information (CSI) matrices. From [19],
[26], we know that a correlated matrix Ra (a generalized
version of Rr and Re) is a function of AoA distribution
(defined by θ), as given in Definition 2, which is a way to
generate a receiver-side correlated matrix.
Definition 2 (Receiver-side correlated matrix): Assume that
all antennas form a uniformly linear antenna array with d =
dmin/ω, where d is the normalized minimum distance, dmin is
the spacing between any two neighbor antennas, and ω is the
wavelength. Each element of a receiver-side correlated matrix
Ra, i.e., [Ra]u,v is
[Ra]u,v = exp
{− j2pid(u− v) cos θ¯} (6)
× exp{− 1
2
[
2pidδ(u− v) sin θ¯]2},
where u ∈ {1, ..., a} and v ∈ {1, ..., a} are the receive antenna
index numbers. For Bob, we have a = r, and for Eve, we have
a = e. The AoA, i.e., θ, follows a Gaussian distribution, where
the mean AoA of θ is θ¯ and the RAS (variance) of θ is δ. A
similar definition of this receiver-side correlated matrix can
be found in [19, Eqn. (4)] and [26, Eqn. (106)]. Based on
the calculations of Eqn. (6), we can see that when u = v,∣∣[Ra]u,v∣∣ equals to one. When u 6= v, ∣∣[Ra]u,v∣∣ approaches to
zero with an increasing d, θ¯, or δ. Hence, Ra approaches to Ia
with an increasing d, θ¯, or δ. This means that the correlation
will be reduced with an increasing d, θ¯, or δ.
Let us use Theorem 1 to specify the properties of the
correlated matrix Ra, which is useful for the approximate
analysis of ergodic secrecy rates in the next section.
Theorem 1 : Let Ra(d), Ra(θ¯), and Ra(δ) be the functions
of d, θ¯, and δ, respectively, as given in Definition 2. The largest
eigenvalue of Ra is defined as σ1(Ra), and the determinant
of Ra is defined as det[Ra]. Then, we get the conclusions as
follows.
• If d1 > d2, we have σ1
[
Ra(d1)
]
< σ1
[
Ra(d2)
]
and
det[Ra(d1)] > det[Ra(d2)].
• If θ¯1 > θ¯2, we have σ1
[
Ra(θ¯1)
]
< σ1
[
Ra(θ¯2)
]
and
det[Ra(θ¯1)] > det[Ra(θ¯2)].
• If δ1 > δ2, we have σ1
[
Ra(δ1)
]
< σ1
[
Ra(δ2)
]
and
det[Ra(δ1)] > det[Ra(δ2)].
Proof: See Appendix A.
Let us define the mean AoAs at Bob and Eve as θ¯Bob and
θ¯Eve, respectively, define RASs at Bob and Eve as δBob and
δEve, respectively, and define the normalized distances at Bob
and Eve as dBob and dEve, respectively.
B. Artificial Noise Precoding
In this paper, we use the AN scheme as proposed in
[14]. There are s1 eigen-subchannels for sending confidential
messages selected by Alice based on CSI feedback from
Bob. s1 is a variable that can be adjusted by Alice. More
specifically, Alice performs the eigenvalue decomposition (eig)
of H†H, which outputs two unitary matrices, i.e., U ∈ Ct×t
and its Hermitian transpose U† ∈ Ct×t. The eig process also
outputs a diagonal matrix Λ ∈ Rt×t, which consists of the
positive and zero eigenvalues of H†H, i.e., (λ1, ..., λt), where
the positive eigenvalues are defined as λ1 > ... > λn, where
n = min(t, r).
Alice generates a message precoding matrix B ∈ Ct×s1 ,
whose columns are the eigenvectors corresponding to the first
to the s1th largest eigenvalues of H†H, and an AN precoding
matrix Z ∈ Ct×s2 (s1 + s2 = t), whose columns are the
eigenvectors of the remaining eigenvalues of H†H.
Remark 1: (Proved in [14, Le. 1]): We can readily show
[HB]†HZ = 0, [HB]†HeZ 6= 0, and [HeB]†HeZ 6= 0.
As the CSI is extremely important in this work, we would
like to discuss about the CSI at Alice and Eve as follows.
• CSI at Alice: As mentioned earlier, let us consider a
slow-fading environment that Alice knows full CSI of
Bob, including H and Rr, via a unprotected broadcast
feedback channel from Bob due to FDD or non-reciprocal
TDD systems [27], but knows only Re and the channel
distribution information (CDI) of Eve. Alice can get the
knowledge of Re and the CDI of Eve, because Eve can be
just a normal receiver in the same communication system
with Alice, and may exchange messages without security
protection. Hence, Alice can obtain Re via historical
CSI of He, i.e., Re = E(HeH†e/t) or statistical AoA
information as shown in Definition 2. Otherwise, Alice
should assume that there is no correlation at Eve side,
i.e., Re = Ie, which is the worst assumption because
Re = Ie will maximize the ergodic wiretap channel
capacity among all realizations of Re [18].
• CSI at Eve: Let us consider a pessimistic scenario that
Eve knows the CSI of all channels, includes H, He,
Rr, and Re. This scenario usually exists in feedback-
based CSI estimation. The investigation in [28] provided
an example of the leaked CSI, where Alice sends a
training signal to Bob and Bob uses feedback channels
to inform Alice of CSI, which allows Bob and Alice
to obtain accurate knowledge of H. However, Eve can
obtain H due to the broadcasting nature of feedback
channels, and Eve can intercept the training signals to
get He. In addition, Eve can obtain Rr = E(HH†/t) and
Re = E(HeH†e/t) according to long-term realizations of
H and He or statistical AoA information as shown in
Definition 2.
Based on the precoding of B and Z, Alice transmits a
combined signal w via t antennas as w = Bx + Zv, and
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the received signals at Bob and Eve can be expressed as
y = HBx + HZv + n, (7)
ye = HeBx + HeZv + ne, (8)
respectively. Here, x is a transmit signal of the desired user,
and v is an AN signal. We follow a convention used in [6],
[7], which used Gaussian input alphabets and Gaussian AN,
i.e., both x and v are circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
vectors with zero-means and covariance matrices P/tIs1 and
P/tIs2 , respectively, where P is an average transmit power
constraint. For analytical simplicity, we distribute total power
over all antennas equally as ρ = P/t. n and ne are the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vectors with their covariance
matrices Ir and Ie, respectively.
It is obvious that each antenna transmits a combination of
message and AN components, but the AN components can be
eliminated by the pre-processor at Bob, who eliminates the AN
signal v by pre-processing ([HB]†HZ = 0), and the received
signal y is
y˜ = [HB]†y = Λs1x + n˜, (9)
where n˜ = [HB]†n ∈ Cs1×1 is an AWGN vector with its
distribution CN (0,Λs1). Λs1 ∈ Rs1×s1 is a diagonal matrix
formed by the first to the s1th eigenvalues of H†H. In the AN
elimination process, the channel, where the received signal is
left-multiplied by a given matrix [HB]†, will not change its
capacity if B includes all eigenvectors of H†H. Since we have
[HB]†HeZ 6= 0 and [HeB]†HeZ 6= 0, Eve can not eliminate
this AN signal under the condition of t > e, such that the
AN signal degrades Eve’s channel capacity even if Eve has
the knowledge of H, He, B, and Z. In this way, we can
enlarge the capacity difference between the main and wiretap
channels.
III. EXACT AND APPROXIMATE ERGODIC
SECRECY RATES
Next, we derive an exact ergodic secrecy rate expression, as
well as perform an approximate analysis to show the impacts
of correlated matrices on the ergodic secrecy rates.
A. Exact Expression for Ergodic Secrecy Rate
In the proposed scheme, P , H, Rr, and Re are system
parameters. The numbers of message and AN streams, denoted
by s1 and s2, are the variables controlled by us. Then, we can
get a real ergodic secrecy rate expression R˜s as
R˜s(P,H,Rr,Re; s1, s2) = EHe,H[Cm − Cw]+ (10)
≥ [EH[Cm]− EHe,H[Cw]]+,
where we have [x]+ = max(x, 0), and
Cm = log2 det(Ir + ρH1H
†
1), (11)
Cw = log2 det
(
Ie +
ρH2H
†
2
ρH3H
†
3 + Ie
)
= log2 det
(
Ie + ρH4H
†
4
)− log2 det(Ie + ρH3H†3).
(12)
Here, we have H1 = HB ∈ Cr×s1 , H2 = HeB ∈ Ce×s1 ,
H3 = HeZ ∈ Ce×s2 , and H4 = [H2,H3] = HeU ∈ Ce×t.
Note that Cm is the main channel capacity that can be
achieved by the pre-processor as shown in Eqn. (9) [14]. The
pre-processor can eliminate the interference among antennas
and AN-induced interference, so that Bob can decode confi-
dential message streams individually. Assume that Eve sees
the Gaussian AN signal and AWGN as a combined AWGN,
views H2 as its CSI, and then uses the minimum mean squared
error (MMSE) with successive interference cancellation (SIC)
technique based on H2 to achieve a wiretap channel capacity,
i.e., Cw. From the conclusions made in [9] and [29, Ch. 8], the
MMSE with SIC technique is the best choice for Eve without
knowledge of Gaussian AN signals.
We have an equality in Eqn. (11) if and only if the secrecy
rates are always nonnegative over all channel states. With
a large s2, i.e., more eigen-subchannels are allocated for
sending AN signals, Cm is much larger than Cw with a high
probability1. However, due to the lack of the knowledge of
He, we can not determine if an instantaneous secrecy rate is
nonnegative or not, and thus we resort to derive a lower bound
of the real ergodic secrecy rate as
Rs(P,H,Rr,Re; s1, s2) = [EH[Cm]− EHe,H[Cw]]+, (13)
assuming that both H and He are independent receiver-side
correlated complex Gaussian matrices.
In order to calculate the ergodic secrecy rate, we need to
calculate EHe,H[Cw], and we should find out the distributions
of random matrices H2, H3, and H4, all of which are the prod-
uct of a complex Gaussian matrix and an independent unitary
matrix. The corresponding results are given in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 : Define He ∼ CN e,t(0,Re ⊗ It) as a receiver-
side correlated central complex Gaussian matrix, and establish
an independent (t × f) unitary matrix F (generalized for B
and Z). We have
HeF ∼ CN e,f (0,Re ⊗ If ), (14)
where f ∈ N and t ≥ f .
Proof: See Appendix B.
From Theorem 2, we know that H2, H3, and H4 are
complex Gaussian matrices with their distributions as
H2 = HeB ∼ CN e,s1(0,Re ⊗ Is1), (15)
H3 = HeZ ∼ CN e,s2(0,Re ⊗ Is2), (16)
H4 = HeU ∼ CN e,t(0,Re ⊗ It), (17)
respectively. In order to evaluate the performance of the AN
scheme further, we should use the pdf of the kth eigenvalue
of complex Wishart matrices to derive a theoretical ergodic
secrecy rate expression of Eqn. (13). Here, we give the
definition of the Wishart matrix, as shown in Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Receiver-side correlated central complex
Wishart matrix): For A ∼ CN a,b(0,Ra⊗Ib), m = max(a, b),
1The test results are available in https://github.com/yiliangliu1990/liugit
pub.
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and n = min(a, b), a Hermitian matrix W ∈ Cn×n is defined
as
W =
{
AA†, b ≥ a,
A†A, b < a,
(18)
where W is called a receiver-side correlated central Wishart
matrix defined as W ∼ Wn(m,0n,Ra) with n degrees of
freedom, and a receiver-side correlated matrix Ra has its
eigenvalues σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ a, where σ1 > σ2 > ... > σa. The
Wishart matrix was investigated first in [30].
An arbitrary MIMO channel (H, H3, or H4) can be
effectively decomposed into multiple parallel SISO eigen-
subchannels. With the help of transmit and receive signal
processing as described in Section II, s1 eigen-subchannels
are selected for sending messages. Then, we can re-write the
ergodic secrecy rate function Eqn. (13) as
Rs(P,Rr,Re; s1, s2) (19)
=
[
CH(Rr, ρ, s1) + CH3(Re, ρ, n1)− CH4(Re, ρ, e)
]+
,
where
CA(Ra, ρ, η) =
η∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + ρx)fλk(x)dx, (20)
in which we have ρ = P/t, A ∈ Ca×b, Ra is an a × a
matrix, λk is the kth largest eigenvalue of AA† (or A†A),
n1 = min(s2, e), and fλk(x) is given in Theorem 3. Note that
the ergodic secrecy rate function takes an integral form rather
than a closed form because fλk(x) is very complicated.
Theorem 3 : For k = 1, ..., n, the marginal pdf of the
kth largest eigenvalue λk of a receiver-side correlated central
Wishart matrix W ∼Wn(m,0n,Ra) is given by
fλk(x) = K
−1
k∑
i=1
∑
µ∈P(i)
n∑
j=1
det
[
G,Ω(µ,σ, i, j;x)
]
, (21)
where we have
K =
n∏
i<j
σi − σj
n∏
i=1
(b− i)!, (22)
and P(i) is a set of all permutations (µ1, ..., µn) of integers
(1, ..., n) such that (µ1 < µ2 < ... < µi−1) and (µi < µi+1 <
... < µn). The set has
(
n
i−1
)
permutations of µ, each of
which is a representation of the matrix function Ω(·). Hence,∑
µ∈P(i) denotes a summation over these
(
n
i−1
)
matrices. G
is an a× (a−n) matrix, whose (i, j)th element is σj−1i . Note
that G is a null matrix when b ≥ a. The a × n real matrix
Ω(µ,σ, i, j;x) is defined as[
Ω(µ,σ, i, j;x)
]
u,µv
(23)
=

σa−n+µv−1u Γ(b− n+ µv, xσu ), v = 1, ..., k − 1, µv 6= j,
−σa−b−1u exp(− xσu )xb−n+µv−1, v = 1, ..., k − 1, µv = j,
σa−n+µv−1u γ(b− n+ µv, xσu ), v = k, ..., n, µv 6= j,
σa−b−1u exp(− xσu )xb−n+µv−1, v = k, ..., n, µv = j,
for u = 1, ..., a and v = 1, ..., n, where Γ(·, ·) and γ(·, ·) are
the upper and lower incomplete Gamma functions [31] defined
as
Γ(, x) =
∫ ∞
x
exp(−z)z−1dz, (24)
γ(, x) =
∫ x
0
exp(−z)z−1dz. (25)
Proof: See Appendix. C.
Note that when Rr = Ir or Re = Ie, CA(Ia, ρ, η) will be
replaced by the equation in [14, Eq. (17)].
Remark 2 : We can use Eqn. (19), as a theoretical ergodic
secrecy rate expression of Eqn. (13), to maximize the ergodic
secrecy rate via a one-dimensional search, which takes the
number of eigen-subchannels of message streams, i.e., s1, as
a search direction. Although the results from the search are not
globally optimal and the achieved ergodic secrecy rates are the
lower bounds of ergodic secrecy capacities, the search with
its complexity O(n) avoids complicated convex optimization
processes.
The eigen-subchannels of larger eigenvalues should be se-
lected for sending messages because CH(Rr, ρ, s1) in Eqn.
(19) is larger when using the eigen-subchannels of larger
eigenvalues for a fixed s1. Meanwhile, which one is selected
for AN signals has no effect on the ergodic secrecy rate for
a fixed s1, because CH3(Re, ρ, n1) in Eqn. (19) is a constant
for a given s1. In addition, CH4(Re, ρ, e) in Eqn. (19) is an
average value over H4, and is fixed for given t and e, which
have nothing to do with s1. Hence, the optimal method must
be that the eigen-subchannels for messages are selected from
their large to small corresponding eigenvalues. For example,
given t = 4, s1 = 2, and s2 = 2, the maximization is achieved
if the 1st and 2nd eigen-subchannels are selected for sending
messages, while the 3rd and 4th eigen-subchannels are selected
for sending AN signals. In this case, maximization is done over
an array with n elements, and the eigen-subchannel allocation
is a one-dimensional search problem with its complexity O(n),
where n = min(t, r).
B. Approximate Ergodic Secrecy Rate
The derived ergodic secrecy rate expression in Eqn. (19) is
not in a closed form. We can simplify the expression to an
approximate form, to show the impacts of correlated matrices
Rr (a function of dBob, θ¯Bob, and δBob) and Re (a function of
dEve, θ¯Eve, and δEve) on the ergodic secrecy rates.
Theorem 4: The ergodic secrecy rate, i.e., Eqn. (19), can be
expressed approximately as
Rapps = [χ1 + χ2]
+, (26)
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where
χ1 =
s1∑
i=1
log2
{
1 + ρE[λi(HH†)]
}
, (27)
χ2 = log2
[
1 +
∑e
k=1 ρ
k
∏k−1
i=0 (m1 − i)%k
1 +
∑e
k=1 ρ
k
∏k−1
i=0 (t− i)%k
]
, (28)
%k =
∑
`1<`2<...<`k
det[Re,(`1,...`k)], (29)
Re,(`1,...`k) =

[Re](`1,`1) . . . [Re](`1,`k)
[Re](`2,`1) . . . [Re](`2,`k)
...
...
[Re](`k,`1) . . . [Re](`k,`k)
 , (30)
n1 = min(e, d), m1 = max(e, d), 1 ≤ k ≤ e. (31)
Here, we denote a subset (`1, ..., `k) of (1, 2, ..., e) such that
`1 < `2 < ... < `k, which means Re,(`1,...`n) = Re. Similar
matrix structures and more explanations were given in [32]
and [33]. λ1(HH†) > λ2(HH†) > ... > λn(HH†) are the
ordered eigenvalues of HH†.
Proof: See Appendix. D.
Remark 3 : (The impact of dBob, θ¯Bob, andδBob): Rr only
affects χ1. When s1 = 1, Eqn. (27) can be re-written as
χ1 = log2
{
1 + PE[λ1(HH†/t)]
}
. (32)
From [34, Th. 1.1], when r/t = c < 1, t → +∞, and r →
+∞, we can get
E[λ1(HH†/t)]→
{
σ1(1 +
c
σ1−1 ), σ1 > 1 +
√
c,
(1 +
√
c)2, σ1 ≤ 1 +
√
c,
(33)
where σ1 is the largest eigenvalue of Rr, i.e., λ1(Rr).
Based on Theorem 1, we know that σ1 decreases mono-
tonically with increasing dBob, θ¯Bob, and δBob, respectively.
Thus, E[λ1(HH†/t)] decreases monotonically with increasing
dBob, θ¯Bob, and δBob, respectively, and then keeps constant.
We can conclude that, when s1 = 1, an ergodic secrecy rate
decreases monotonically with increasing dBob, θ¯Bob, and δBob,
respectively.
When s1 = n = min(t, r), based on [32, Eqs. (22) and
(30)], Eqn. (27) can be expressed approximately as
χ1 =
n∑
i=1
log2
{
1 + ρE[λi(HH†)]
}
, (34)
' n log2 ρ+ ~+ log2 det[Rr],
where
~ =
{
log2
∑n−1
i=0 (m− i) ρE[λi(HH†)] 1,∑n−1
i=0 ψ(m− i) ρE[λi(HH†)] 1,
(35)
and m = max(t, r), n = min(t, r), and ψ(x) is defined as
ψ(x) = −ξ +
x−1∑
i=1
1
i
, (36)
where ξ ' 0.5772156649 is the Euler’s constant. It is obvious
that Eqn. (34) increases monotonically with an increasing
TABLE I
IMPACTS OF CORRELATION ON ERGODIC SECRECY RATES.
Sides s1 Impacts
Correlation at Bob s1 = 1 R
app
s ↓ with {dBob, θ¯Bob, δBob} ↑
s1 = n R
app
s ↑ with {dBob, θ¯Bob, δBob} ↑
Correlation at Eve Arbitrary s1 R
app
s ↓ with {dEve, θ¯Eve, δEve} ↑
det[Rr]. Based on Theorem 1, we know that det[Rr] increases
monotonically with increasing dBob, θ¯Bob, and δBob, respec-
tively. In conclusion, when s1 = n, an ergodic secrecy rate
increases monotonically with increasing dBob, θ¯Bob, and δBob,
respectively. However, when n > s1 > 1, it is very hard to
find a simple relationship between an ergodic secrecy rate and
correlation parameters, and thus we simulate these scenarios,
as given in Section IV.
Remark 4 : (The impact of dEve, θ¯Eve, and δEve): In Eqn. (26),
Re affects χ2 only. Based on [32, Eqs. (12) and (16)], we can
get
det[I + Re] = 1 +
e∑
k=1
∑
`1<`2<...<`k
det[Re,(`1,...`k)]. (37)
Since Re is a Hermitian positive definite matrix, det[I + Re]
increases monotonically with an increasing det[Re]. Certainly,
we know that
∑e
k=1
∑
`1<`2<...<`k
det[Re,(`1,...`k)] increases
monotonically with an increasing det[Re]. In addition, we will
introduce an auxiliary function f(x) as
f(x) =
1 +
∑e
k=1 akxk
1 +
∑e
k=1 bkxk
, (38)
where bk > ak, ∀k. f(x) decreases monotonically
with
∑e
k=1 xk. Hence, χ2 decreases monotonically with∑e
k=1
∑
`1<`2<...<`k
det[Re,(`1,...`k)] as well as det[Re].
Therefore, Eqn. (28) decreases with det[Re]. Similarly,
det[Re] increases monotonically with dEve, θ¯Eve, and δEve,
respectively. Thus, an ergodic secrecy rate decreases mono-
tonically with increasing dEve, θ¯Eve, and δEve, respectively.
Table I shows the impacts of {dBob, θ¯Bob, and δBob}, as well
as {dEve, θ¯Eve, and δEve} on the ergodic secrecy rates. We use
↑ and ↓ to represent monotonically “increase” and “decrease”,
respectively. For example, “Rapps ↓ with {dEve, θ¯Eve, δEve} ↑”
means that “the ergodic secrecy rate decreases monotonically
with increasing dEve, θ¯Eve, and δEve, respectively”. We must
point out that “increase” or “decrease” will not take place
forever, because when the correlation parameters grow to a
certain extent, the correlation disappears and ergodic secrecy
rates will be constant.
IV. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATE RESULTS
In this section, numerical and simulation results are given.
As shown in the figures below, the theoretical results (theo.)
from Eqn. (19) are in a good agreement with the Monte
Carlo simulations (simu.) of 105 independent runs on Eqn.
(10). The ergodic secrecy rates of the proposed scheme are
compared to the traditional AN schemes [8]–[11], which did
not consider the correlation and used all eigen-subchannels
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(a) Ergodic secrecy rates in low SNR regions.
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(b) Ergodic secrecy rates in high SNR regions.
Fig. 2. Numerical and simulation results of ergodic secrecy rates of a correlated MIMO channel in terms of transmit SNR, where t = 6, r = e = 4,
dBob = dEve = 0.8, θ¯Bob = θ¯Eve = 30◦, and δBob = δEve = 10◦.
to transmit messages, i.e., s1 = n. In the proposed scheme,
the number of eigen-subchannels for sending messages, i.e.,
s1, is a variable. The channel model in the simulations is a
receiver-side correlated Rayleigh fading channel.
Fig. 2 illustrates the impact of transmit SNR on ergodic
secrecy rates with different choices of {s1, s2}. As shown in
Fig. 2(a), the achievable ergodic secrecy rates increase almost
exponentially with SNR, and s1 = 2 is the best choice when
SNR< 16. There exists a crossing point between s1 = 2 and
s1 = 3 because s1 = 3 offers a better performance with an in-
creasing SNR, which is consistent with [14, Th. 5]. In addition,
the black and dashed lines are simulation results without the
awareness of the correlated fading that are conformed to the
scenarios {s1 = 2, s2 = 4} and {s1 = 1, s2 = 5}2. If we do
not consider (or do not know) correlation parameters at Eve’s
sides, the ergodic secrecy rates will be reduced compared
to the performance with the knowledge of Eve’s correlation
parameters, because the ergodic wiretap channel rate will be
enlarged if there is on correlation among Eve’s antennas.
Fig. 2(b) shows the results in high SNR regions, where
ergodic secrecy rates grow almost linearly with SNR. We
see that s1 = 3 is the best choice, and the simulations of
s1 = 2 and s1 = 4 show similar performance. The results
indicate that it is better to allocate stronger eigen-subchannels
to transmit messages and weaker eigen-subchannels to send
AN signals, especially in high SNR regions, which coincides
with the results given in the uncorrelated scenarios [14].
Fig. 3 shows the relationship between ergodic secrecy rates
and the number of antennas of Bob. We can observe that an
increasing number of antennas at Bob is beneficial for any
s1 and s2 chosen. If Bob has many receive antennas, it can
enlarge the channel gains of the message streams because Bob
has enough antennas to decode them and gather the received
power from all antennas. The previous works in [8]–[11] did
2The more results are given in https://github.com/yiliangliu1990/liugit pub.
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Fig. 3. Numerical and simulation results of ergodic secrecy rates in a
correlated MIMO channel in terms of the number of antennas of Bob, where
t = 5, e = 3, transmit SNR=5 dB, dBob = dEve = 0.8, θ¯Bob = θ¯Eve = 30◦,
and δBob = δEve = 10◦.
not consider the scenarios with t < r, and thus we do not
compare them here.
Fig. 4 shows the ergodic secrecy rate simulations in terms
of antenna spacing in wavelength, where we set SNR= 5 dB,
θ¯Bob = θ¯Eve = 30
◦, and δBob = δEve = 10◦. Assume that dEve
is fixed in Fig. 4(a). When s1 = 3 and s1 = 4, the ergodic
secrecy rates grow with the antenna spacing; when s1 = 1,
the ergodic secrecy rates decrease with the antenna spacing.
If s1 = 2, we see a peak value of the ergodic secrecy rates,
where the rates rise at the beginning, then reduce, and keep
constant. Intuitively, the peak occurs due to the fact that the
curve of s1 = 2 is affected by variations of the largest and the
second largest eigen-subchannels, where the gain of the second
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(a) Ergodic secrecy rates in terms of dBob, where dEve = 0.8.
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(b) Ergodic secrecy rates in terms of dEve, where dBob = 0.8.
Fig. 4. Numerical and simulation results of ergodic secrecy rates in a correlated MIMO channel in terms of the normalized minimum distances dBob and
dEve, where transmit SNR=5 dB, t = 6, r = e = 4, θ¯Bob = θ¯Eve = 30◦, and δBob = δEve = 10◦.
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(a) Ergodic secrecy rates in terms of θ¯Bob, where θ¯Eve = 30◦.
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(b) Ergodic secrecy rates in terms of θ¯Eve, where θ¯Bob = 30◦.
Fig. 5. Numerical and simulation results of ergodic secrecy rates in a correlated MIMO channel in terms of mean AoA θ¯Bob and θ¯Eve, where transmit SNR=5
dB, t = 6, r = e = 4, dBob = dEve = 0.8, and δBob = δEve = 10◦.
largest eigen-subchannel increases fast at the beginning, and
the gain of the largest eigen-subchannel decreases fast in
the second half of the simulation diagram. In Fig. 4(b), we
assumed that dBob is fixed, and we can see that the ergodic
secrecy rates decrease with the antenna spacing. In particular,
the more eigen-subchannels are allocated for messages, the
more quickly the ergodic secrecy rates will decrease. Note
that in Figs. 4(a) and 4(b), when the normalized minimum
distances are larger than three, the receiver-side correlation
almost disappears. Therefore, the curves of ergodic secrecy
rates tend to be constant. This phenomenon also appears in
traditional MIMO systems [18], [35].
Fig. 5 examines the ergodic secrecy rates in terms of mean
AoA in a correlated MIMO channel, where dBob = dEve = 0.8
and δBob = δEve = 10◦. Fig. 5(a) shows the effects of Bob’s
mean AoA with a fixed θ¯Eve, where an increasing mean AoA
will reduce the gain of the strongest eigen-subchannel, such
that the ergodic secrecy rates will be reduced if we only
chose the strongest one, i.e., s1 = 1. However, an increasing
mean AoA will reduce the correlation at receiver-side, and
thus the ergodic secrecy rate will increase if we use most
of the eigen-subchannels to transmit messages. As shown in
Fig. 5(b), assuming θ¯Bob is fixed, we see that the ergodic
secrecy rates will reduce with an increasing AoA of Eve
because an increasing AoA of Eve will reduce the receiver-
side correlation, which enlarges the wiretap channel capacities
but does not affect the main channel capacities at all.
RAS has also its impact on the ergodic secrecy rates, which
has a similar effect as the mean AoA. As shown in Fig. 6(a),
an increasing RAS of Bob will reduce receiver-side correlation
and reduce the gain of the strongest eigen-subchannel. Hence,
when s1 = 1, the ergodic secrecy rates will decrease with
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(a) Ergodic secrecy rates in terms of δBob, where δEve = 10◦.
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(b) Ergodic secrecy rates in terms of δEve, where δBob = 10◦.
Fig. 6. Numerical and simulation results of ergodic secrecy rates in a correlated MIMO channel in terms of RAS δBob and δEve, where transmit SNR=5 dB,
t = 6, r = e = 4, dBob = dEve = 0.8, and θ¯r = θ¯e = 30◦.
δBob, and when s1 = 2, 3, and 4, the ergodic secrecy rates will
increase because a weaker receiver-side correlation enlarges
the main channel capacities. As shown in Fig. 6(b) with a fixed
δBob, an increasing RAS of Eve reduces the ergodic secrecy
rate with an arbitrary number of message streams. The curve
of s1 = 4 grows fast if compared to s1=1, 2, and 3.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we investigated the ergodic secrecy rate
of spatially correlated scattering Rayleigh fading channels
in an artificial noisy MIMO system, along with theoretical
and approximate ergodic secrecy rate analysis. The suitable
number of eigen-subchannels for sending messages and AN
signals can be identified via a one-dimensional search based
on the derived ergodic secrecy rate expressions. According
to the results given in the analyses and simulations, we
revealed that the correlation parameters, i.e., mean AoA, RAS,
and antenna spacing, have significant influence on ergodic
secrecy rates. Nevertheless, a real MIMO channel may be
transmitter-side correlated or doubly-correlated at both sides.
When considering the transmitter-side correlated or doubly-
correlated channels, the derivation of statistical distribution
of HeF, as shown in Theorem 2, is still an open issue.
Hence, in the future, we should establish a new Wishart matrix
model first before investigating the impacts of those correlated
channels on ergodic secrecy rates.
VI. APPENDICES
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1 (Proved in [36, Th. 2.1]): For r × r matrices
A = [aij ] and B = [bij ], if A and B are Hermitian positive
(semi-)definite, then
σ1(A ◦B) ≤ max
1≤i≤r
aiiσ1(B), (39)
where aii is a diagonal element of A, and “◦” denotes the
Schur product defined as A ◦B = [aijbij ].
Lemma 2 (Proved in [37, Th. 3]): For two r × r matrices
A = [aij ] and B = [bij ], if A and B are Hermitian positive
(semi-)definite, then
r∏
i=1
σi(A ◦B) ≥
r∏
i=1
σi(B)aii. (40)
We begin to prove Theorem 1 as follows. For d1 > d2, we
can build up Ra(d1) via Ra(d2) as
Ra(d1) = M ◦Ra(d2), (41)
where M is a Hermitian matrix whose diagonal elements are
all one. If d1 > d2 and i 6= j, based on Eqn. (6), we can find
that the modulus value of [Ra(d1)]i,j is smaller, i.e.,
|[Ra(d1)]i,j | < |[Ra(d2)]i,j |. (42)
Thus, M is positive (semi-)definite because all diagonal
elements of M are one, and the modulus of non-diagonal
elements is smaller than one. Based on Lemma 1 and Eqn.
(41), we can get
σ1[Ra(d1)] ≤ max
1≤i≤n
miiσ1[Ra(d2)], (43)
and mii is a diagonal element of M such that mii = 1. Hence,
σ1[Ra(d1)] < σ1[Ra(d2)]. With the same argument, we can
show that σ1[Ra(θ¯)] and σ1[Ra(δ)] have the same property.
Based on Lemma 2 and aii = 1, we get
det[Ra(d1)] =
r∏
i=1
σi
[
M ◦Ra(d2)
]
(44)
≥
r∏
i=1
σi
[
Ra(d2)
]
mii = det[Ra(d2)].
Note det[Ra(d1)] 6= det[Ra(d2)], and thus “>” is held.
Similarly, det[Ra(θ¯)] and det[(Ra(δ)] have the same property.

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B. Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 3 (Proved in [38, Th. 2.3.2]): If He∼
CN e,t(0,Re ⊗ It), the characteristic function of He
is
φHe(X) = E
{
etr[iHeX†)]
}
= etr
(− 1
2
X†ReXIt
)
, (45)
where i =
√−1.
Next, we can prove Theorem 2 based on Lemma 3. For a
given (t × s) unitary matrix B, the characteristic function of
HeB is
φHeB(X) = E[etr(iHeBX
†)] = E[etr(iHeY†)], (46)
where Y† = BX†. Viewing Y as a variable, from Lemma 1,
we get
E[etr(iHeY†)] = etr
(− 1
2
Y†ReY
)
(47)
= etr
(− 1
2
X†ReXB†B
)
.
Since B is a (t × s) unitary matrix, we have B†B = Is.
Then, Eqn. (46) can be written as
φHeB(X) = etr
(− 1
2
X†ReXB†B
)
(48)
= etr
(− 1
2
X†ReXIs
)
.
As Eqn. (48) is the characteristic function of a complex
Gaussian matrix with its covariance matrix Re⊗ Is, the proof
is completed. 
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let us define the cdf Fλk(x) as
Fλk(x) = P (λk ≤ x) (49)
= P (λk−1 ≤ x) + p,
where p = P (λn < · · · < λk < x < λk−1 < · · · < λ1). Let
the domain be D1 = {0 < λ1 < · · · < λn < x}, D2 = {x <
λ1 < · · · < λn < ∞}, and D3 = {λn < · · · < λk < x <
λk−1 < · · · < λ1}.
Lemma 6 (Proved in [39]): The joint pdf of the ordered
eigenvalues λ1 > · · · > λn > 0 of a receiver-side correlated
central Wishart matrix W ∼Wn(m,0n,Ra) is
fλ(λ) = K
−1
0 det
[
G,E(λ)
] n∏
i<j
(λi − λj)
n∏
i=1
λb−ni , (50)
where
K0 =
{∏a
i=1 σ
b−n
i (b− i)!
∏a
i<j σi − σj , b ≥ a,∏b
i=1(b− i)!
∏a
i<j σi − σj , b < a,
(51)
and G is a a × (a − n) matrix, whose (i, j)th element is
σj−1i . σ = (σ1, ...σa) are the eigenvalues of Ra, such that
σ1 > ... > σa > 0. E(λ) is a a × n matrix, whose (i, j)th
element is [σa−n−1i exp(−λj−a+n/σi)].
Integrating Eqn. (50) over D3, we can get the probability p
as
p = K−10
∫
D3
det[G,E(λ)]
n∏
i<j
(λi − λj)
n∏
i=1
λb−ni dλi. (52)
Performing the Laplace expansion over the first a−n columns
of [G,E(λ)], we gave
det[G,E(λ)] =
∑
κ∈Q(i)
(−1)
∑a−n
i=1 (κi+i) det[Gκ] det[Eκ(λ)],
(53)
where Q(i) is a set of all permutations (κ1, ..., κa) of the
integers (1, ..., a), such that (κ1 < κ2 < ... < κa−n) and
(κa−n+1 < κa−n+2 < ... < κa). Hence,
∑
κ∈Q(i) denotes the
summation over two combinations (κ1 < κ2 < ... < κa−n)
and (κa−n+1 < κa−n+2 < ... < κa). [Eκ(λ)] is a n × n
matrix, i.e., [Eκ(λ)]i,j = σa−n−1κa−n+i exp(−λj/σκa−n+i) for
i, j = 1, ..., n. [Gκ] is a (a − n) × (a − n) Vandermonde
matrix, i.e., [Gκ]i,j = σj−1κi for i, j = 1, ..., a − n. When
a = n, we set det[Gκ] = 1.
Next, we prove Eqn. (54) for simplifying Eqn. (52). In
Eqn. (54),
∑∼
q denotes the summation over all permutations
(q1, . . . , qn) of (1, . . . , n),
∑∼
ι is the summation over all
permutations (ι1, . . . , ιn) of (1, . . . , n), and per(ι1, . . . , ιn)
is either 0 or 1, corresponding to even or odd value of the
permutation (ι1, . . . , ιn). Then, p can be written as
p = K−10
∫
D3
det[G,E(λ)]
n∏
i<j
(λi − λj)
n∏
i=1
λb−ni dλi (55)
= K−10
∑
κ∈Q(i)
(−1)
∑a−n
i=1 (κi+i) det[Gκ]
n∏
i=1
σa−n−1κa−n+i
∼∑
q
∼∑
ι
× (−1)per(ι1,...,ιn)
∫
D3
n∏
i=1
λιi−1qi exp(−
λqi
σκa−n+i
)
n∏
i=1
λb−ni dλqi
= K−10
∑
µ∈P(k)
∑
κ∈Q(i)
(−1)
∑a−n
i=1 (κi+i) det[Gκ]
n∏
i=1
σa−n−1κa−n+i
×
∼∑
ι
(−1)per(ι1,...,ιn)I1(µ, ι, κ)I2(µ, ι, κ),
where
∑∼
q =
∑
µ∈P(k)
∑∼
qµψ
∑∼
qµω
, and
∑∼
qµψ
denotes
the summation over the permutations (qµ1 , . . . , qµk−1) of
(1, . . . , k − 1), ∑∼qµω calculates the summation over the
permutations (qµk , . . . , qµn) of (k, . . . , n),
∑
µ∈P(k) is the
summation over the combination of sets (µ1 < µ2 < · · · <
µk−1) and (µk < µk+1 < · · · < µn), and (µ1, . . . , µn) is a
permutation of (1, . . . , n). From [25, Eqs. (4.20) and (4.21)],
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det
[
Eκ(λ)
] n∏
i<j
(λi − λj) =
n∏
i=1
σa−n−1κa−n+i
∼∑
q
∼∑
ι
(−1)per(ι1,...,ιn)
n∏
i=1
λιi−1qi exp(−
λqi
σκa−n+i
). (54)
we obtain
I1(µ, ι, κ) =
∼∑
qµψ
∫
D4
k−1∏
i=1
λb−n+ιi−1qµi exp(−
λqµi
σκa−n+µi
)dλqµi
=
k−1∏
i=1
∫ ∞
x
λb−n+ιi−1µi exp(−
λµi
σκa−n+µi
)dλµi
=
k−1∏
i=1
σb−n+ιiκa−n+µiΓ(b− n+ ιi,
λµi
σκa−n+µi
), (56)
I2(µ, ι, κ) =
∼∑
qµω
∫
D5
n∏
i=k
λb−n+ιi−1qµi exp(−
λqµi
σκa−n+µi
)dλqµi
=
n∏
i=k
∫ x
0
λιi−1µi exp(−
λµi
σκa−n+µi
)dλµi
=
n∏
i=k
σb−n+ιiκa−n+µiγ(b− n+ ιi,
λµi
σκa−n+µi
), (57)
where D4 = {x < λk−1 < · · · < λ1 < ∞} and
D5 = {0 < λn < · · · < λk < x}. ιi is the ith position after
re-ordering (ι1, . . . , ιn), which can be viewed as the column
index of the determinant of an (n× n) matrix. µi is the row
index of the determinant of the (n× n) matrix dependent on
k. Hence,
∑∼
ι (−1)per(ι1,...,ιn)I1(µ, ι, κ)I2(µ, ι, κ) denotes the
determinant of a matrix, each element of which is expressed
by [Θ(µ,σ,κ, k;x)]µi,i. We can re-define the order index
numbers of rows and columns of the determinant as u and
µv . Finally, we get
p = K−10
∑
µ∈P(k)
∑
κ∈Q(i)
(−1)
∑a−n
i=1 (κi+i) det[Gκ] (58)
×
n∏
i=1
σa−n−1κa−n+i det
[
Θ(µ,σ,κ, k;x)
]
,
where (n× n) real matrix Θ(µ,σ,κ, k;x) is defined as[
Θ(µ,σ,κ, k;x)
]
u,µv
(59)
=
σ
b−n+µv
κa−n+u Γ(b− n+ µv, xσκa−n+u ), v = 1, ..., k − 1,
σb−n+µvκa−n+u γ(b− n+ µv, xσκa−n+u ), v = k, ..., n,
for u, v = 1, ..., n, where Γ(·, ·) and γ(·, ·) are the upper and
lower incomplete Gamma functions defined in Eqns. (24) and
(25).
Since we have
n∏
i=1
σa−n−1κa−n+i det
[
Θ(µ,σ,κ, k;x)
]
(60)
=
n∏
i=1
σb−nκa−n+i det[Ψ(µ,σ,κ, k;x)],
where (n× n) real matrix Ψ(µ,σ, k, κ;x) is defined as
[Ψ(µ,σ,κ, k;x)]u,µv (61)
=
σ
a−n+µv−1
κa−n+u Γ(b− n+ µv, xσκa−n+u ), v = 1, ..., k − 1,
σa−n+µv−1κa−n+u γ(b− n+ µv, xσκa−n+u ), v = k, ..., n,
for u, v = 1, ..., n. Substituting Eqn. (60) to Eqn. (58) and
performing the inverse Laplace expansion of Eqn. (58), we
obtain
p = K−10
n∏
i=1
σb−ni
∑
µ∈P(k)
det[G,Ψ(µ,σ, k;x)] (62)
= K−1
∑
µ∈P(k)
det[G,Ψ(µ,σ, k;x)],
where
K =
n∏
i<j
σi − σj
n∏
i=1
(b− i)!. (63)
Fλk(x) can be expressed by
Fλk(x) = K
−1
k∑
i=1
∑
µ∈P(i)
det[G,Ψ(µ,σ, i;x)], (64)
which is the marginal cdf of the kth largest eigenvalue
λk of a receiver-side correlated central Wishart matrix
W∼Wn(m,0n,Ra). The marginal pdf of the kth largest
eigenvalue can be easily derived from the derivative of a
determinant as shown in [40], which is
fλk(x) =
d
dx
{
K−1
k∑
i=1
∑
µ∈P(i)
det
[
G,Ψ(µ,σ, i;x)
]}
= K−1
k∑
i=1
∑
µ∈P(i)
n∑
j=1
det
[
G,Ω(µ,σ, i, j;x)
]
, (65)
where (n × n) real matrix Ω(µ,σ, i, j;x) is defined in Eqn.
(23). This completes the proof. 
D. Proof of Theorem 4
According to Jensen’s inequality, we have
CA(Ra, ρ, η) =
η∑
i=1
E
{
log2[1 + (P/t)λi(AA
†)]
}
(66)
≤
η∑
i=1
log2
{
1 + (P/t)E[λi(AA†)]
}
,
where λ1(AA†) > λ2(AA†) > · · · > λn(AA†) are the
ordered eigenvalues of AA†. Thus, CH(Rr, ρ, s1) in Eqn.
(19) can be expressed as
CH(Rr, ρ, s1) = χ1 =
s1∑
i=1
log2
{
1 + ρE[λi(HH†)]
}
. (67)
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From [32, Eqn. (21)] or [33, Eqn. (27)], we get
CH3(Re, ρ, n1) = log2
[
1 +
e∑
k=1
ρk
k−1∏
i=0
(m1 − i)%k
]
, (68)
and
CH4(Re, ρ, e) = log2
[
1 +
e∑
k=1
ρk
k−1∏
i=0
(t− i)%k
]
, (69)
respectively, where %k, n1, and m1 are defined in Eqns. (29)
and (31). We can simplify CH3(Re, ρ, n1)−CH4(Re, ρ, e) as
CH3(Re, ρ, n1)− CH4(Re, ρ, e) (70)
= χ2 = log2
[
1 +
∑e
k=1 ρ
k
∏k−1
i=0 (m1 − i)%k
1 +
∑e
k=1 ρ
k
∏k−1
i=0 (t− i)%k
]
.
Hence, Eqn. (13) can be expressed approximately by
Rapps = [χ1 + χ2]
+. (71)
This completes the proof. 
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